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COP-WATCH: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO RECORD 
POLICE ACTIVITY AND ITS LIMITS 
 
Raoul Shah 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last year, the news headlines blaring that a police officer’s 
potentially inappropriate actions were recorded have become almost too familiar. 
The social climate has shifted to one where much of the historic trust that was 
placed in police officers has become questioned following the events in Ferguson, 
Missouri, and Staten Island, New York. The timing of this social climate shift has 
lined up perfectly with the prominence of smart-phones that are capable of 
recording high definition videos and sound recording. However, police have also 
historically cited to wiretap laws, which were intended to protect citizens from 
being recorded without consent, as a basis to arrest citizens for videotaping police 
activity.
1
 
The issue of whether or not there is an established constitutional right to 
record police activity has arisen on various occasions without a definitive 
answer.
2
 In Rivera v. Foley, Pedro Rivera heard that there had been a serious car 
accident and went out to the scene with his own drone.
3
 The drone had been set 
up to “record visual images of the accident scene.”4 Rivera was standing outside 
of the scene of the accident and observing the officers responding to the call, and 
                                                          
1
 Michael Potere, Who Will Watch the Watchmen? Citizens Recording Police Conduct, 106 NW. 
U. L. Rev. 273 (2012). 
2
 Rivera v. Foley, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *24 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2015). 
3
 Id. at *3. 
4
 Id. 
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flew his drone about one hundred and fifty feet over the accident scene.
5
 Some of 
the uniformed officers came over and asked Rivera to identify himself and what 
he was doing.
6
 Rivera informed them that he was a photographer for a television 
station, but that he was not acting in that capacity at the time although he on 
occasion would forward video footage from the drone to the television station.
7
 
The officers demanded that Rivera quit operating the drone and leave, even 
though he was not violating any laws.
8
 The officers also called Rivera’s 
supervisors at work to complain that Rivera was interfering with a police 
investigation, and as a result, Rivera was suspended from work for one week.
9
 
Rivera then sued, alleging that the officers’ actions violated his First and Fourth 
Amendment rights.
10
 
The police officers claimed, among other things, that their conduct was 
protected by qualified immunity.
11
 Qualified immunity protects municipal officers 
from being liable as individuals under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim when 
they were engaged in “discretionary functions.”12 Qualified immunity exists “to 
protect officials when they must make difficult ‘on-the-job’ decisions.”13 The 
threshold inquiry to determine if qualified immunity is applicable is whether the 
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right given the specific context of that 
                                                          
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. at *3-*4. 
7
 Id. at *4. 
8
 Id. at *4-*5. 
9
 Id. at *5-*6.  
10
 Id. at *6. 
11
 Id. at *13. 
12
 Id. (quoting Williams v. Lopes, 64 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41 (D. Conn. 1999)). 
13
 Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639 at *13-*14 (quoting Alto v. Anthony, 782 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 
(D. Conn. 2011)). 
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case.
14
 If it appears that the official conduct did violate a constitutional right, the 
second prong of the test is to determine if that right is one that has been clearly 
established, such that the unlawfulness of the conduct would be apparent “in light 
of the pre-existing law.”15 Only if the conduct is found to have violated a clearly 
established constitutional right will a claim under § 1983 not be barred by 
qualified immunity. 
The discussion in Rivera v. Foley included an analysis of whether “the 
right to photograph and record police officers who are engaged in an ongoing 
investigation was clearly established as a matter of constitutional law” at the time 
of the incident in question.
16
 The District Court for Connecticut held that because 
there had been a split between the other circuit courts as to whether or not such a 
right was clearly established, Rivera’s recording of the police officers’ activity 
was not protected and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
17
 The court 
went one step further and said that even if the right had been clearly established, 
Rivera’s use of a drone surpassed other cases where recording was all done from a 
handheld device and thus would not have been protected anyway.
18
 
This article will advance the argument that the courts should find in future 
cases that the right to record police activity has been clearly established as a 
constitutional right, but that use of a drone to record police activity should not be 
recognized as a constitutional right. In Part II, this article will discuss the current 
split between the circuit courts as to whether recording police activity is a clearly 
                                                          
14
 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001)). 
15
 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002)). 
16
 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639 at *24. 
17
 Id.  
18
 Id. at *25-*26. 
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established constitutional right. Part III of this article will discuss the extent of the 
First Amendment as established by the United States Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence over time. Part IV of this article will discuss the right to record 
police activity in light of the case law regarding the First Amendment. The article 
will conclude that the right to record police activity is a clearly established 
constitutional right when a handheld device is used but use of a drone may be 
beyond the scope of that right. 
II. CONFLICT BETWEEN CIRCUITS 
The District Court for the District of Connecticut identified that the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have been split as to whether or not the right to record police 
activity is a constitutional right that is clearly established such that it can defeat a 
claim of qualified immunity when an officer inhibits those actions.
19
 The First, 
Seventh, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits have all held that the right to photograph 
and record police officers in the performance of their duties is protected under the 
First Amendment.
20
 The Third Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, however, have all 
denied the existence of such a right.
21
 
a. Circuits that Recognize the Right to Record Police Activity 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue in a case arising out 
of actions that took place in October of 2007.
22
 Glik saw three police officers 
arresting a young man and, out of concern that the officers were using excessive 
                                                          
19
 Id. at *24. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Glik v. Cunniffe, , 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011). 
  Vol. 37.1 219 
force, started to take video on his cell phone from approximately ten feet away.
23
 
One of the officers asked if Glik was also recording audio and when Glik stated 
that he was, the officer arrested Glik for a violation of the wiretap law and 
confiscated the cell phone.
24
 The charges against him were later dismissed, and 
Glik filed a civil rights action against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 
that his First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
25
 The officers claimed 
that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that there was no 
established constitutional right to record police officers.
26
 
The district court denied the motion to dismiss.
27
 On appeal, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that based on principles from United States 
Supreme Court case law, they had already recognized a prior case that “the 
videotaping of public officials is an exercise of First Amendment liberties.”28 The 
court also stated that it did not matter that this was a private individual rather than 
a reporter recording the events because the First Amendment extends to the 
public, not just the press.
29
 
In ACLU v. Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to 
consider whether an eavesdropping statute was unconstitutional for impinging on 
citizens’ First Amendment rights.30 The court reasoned that courts have not 
“seriously questioned that the processes of writing words down on paper, painting 
                                                          
23
 Id. at 79-80. 
24
 Id. at 80. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id.  
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. at 83; see Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that when a journalist 
films public officials in a peaceful, law abiding manner, in an exercise of his First Amendment 
rights, police officers do not have the authority to stop him).  
29
 Glik, 655 F.3d. at 83-84; see also Part III(b)(i), infra. 
30
 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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a picture, and playing an instrument are purely expressive activities entitled to full 
First Amendment protection.”31 Although those acts can be broken down into 
specific acts that would not be considered speech under the common definition, 
such as forming each line of a letter or an individual stroke of the paintbrush, the 
court has “not attempted to disconnect the end product from the act of creation.”32 
Thus, “the act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included 
within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary 
of the right to disseminate the resulting recording.”33 The Seventh Circuit easily 
extended these arguments to audio and visual recordings because they, like 
painting and writing, are methods of enabling speech.
34
 The court held that these 
principles were universally accepted, and thus established under the First 
Amendment rights.
35
 
The Eleventh Circuit in Smith v. City of Cumming reviewed a case where 
summary judgment had been granted to the City and police chief on a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 claim.
36
 The court held that there was no doubt that the Smiths had a right to 
record police activity that was subject to “reasonable time, manner, and place 
restrictions.”37 However, the court denied review in a per curiam decision 
because the Smiths failed to show that the conduct by the police or City deprived 
                                                          
31
 Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2010). 
32
 Id. 
33
 ACLU, 679 F.3d at 595. 
34
 Id. at 597. 
35
 Id. 
36
 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000). 
37
 Id. 
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them of that right in their complaint.
38
 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
whether the right to record police activity was not at issue in that case. 
 The case from the Ninth Circuit referred to by the Rivera court did not 
explicitly say that there was a right to record police activity specifically, but could 
be interpreted as such. In that case, Jerry Fordyce had volunteered to videotape a 
demonstration for broadcast on a public television channel.
39
 The police officers 
present at the demonstration, who were also subjected to being recorded, were not 
pleased by the recording and tried to physically prevent him from recording.
40
 
Specifically, Fordyce alleged that he was assaulted when a police officer grabbed 
his camera and smashed it into his face.
41
 This incident was recorded by the video 
camera.
42
 Fordyce was ultimately arrested for videotaping two boys after the adult 
who was with them asked him to stop, pursuant to a Washington statute that 
forbade recording private conversations without consent.
43
 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the officers were protected by qualified immunity as to 
the arrest, since they had a reasonable belief that Fordyce had committed a 
misdemeanor by recording the boys.
44
 However, the court remanded because 
there were still genuine issues of fact as to whether Fordyce was assaulted by the 
officers prior to that in an attempt to dissuade him from exercising his First 
Amendment rights.
45
 This holding could be taken to mean that there is a First 
                                                          
38
 Id. at 1333. 
39
 Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1995).  
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. at 439. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. at 439-40. 
45
 Id. at 439. 
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Amendment right to record police activity in public that officers may not try to 
dissuade citizens from exercising. 
 
 
b. Circuits that Deny the Right to Record Police Activity 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied that the right to record police 
activity during a traffic stop was well established as a constitutional right under 
the First Amendment.
46
 In Kelly, the court found that the case law was insufficient 
to support a conclusion that competent officers would have fair notice that 
arresting someone for recording police activity would be a violation of their First 
Amendment rights.
47
 Although some of the court’s jurisprudence declared that 
there was a right to record police activity, other cases decided by the court held 
that there may need to be an express purpose in order to have a video recording be 
protected under the First Amendment.
48
 Further, the court had denied that 
recording a public meeting was protected under the First Amendment.
49
 
Therefore, the court held that there was not a clearly established constitutional 
right to record all police activity such that police officers would be aware that 
impeding a citizen from recording would infringe upon constitutional 
protections.
50
 
 In Szymecki v. Houck, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly ruled 
that there was not a clearly established right to record police activity in that 
                                                          
46
 Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
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circuit.
51
 The court stated that when determining if a right is clearly established, it 
need only look at decisions made by the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and the highest court from the state where the case was originally 
from.
52
 It went on to hold in a per curiam decision that after reviewing the record 
and legal authorities, it seemed clear to them that police officers were protected 
by qualified immunity for stopping citizens from recording their activities because 
in that circuit the right to record police activity was not clearly established.
53
 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
a. The First Amendment and its Purpose 
The Founding Fathers of the United States of America established that 
“Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”54 The United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted the First Amendment as a means to allow citizens to collect and 
distribute information and prohibiting the government from limiting the 
information that is available to the public.
55
 This right is to collect and distribute 
information is particularly important when it relates to government actions.
56
 The 
government would potentially have a great incentive in and motive to repressing 
opposition, and carries the power to suppress what information is available.
57
 
                                                          
51
 353 Fed. Appx. 852 (4th Cir. 2009). 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. at 853. 
54
 U.S. const., Amend I. 
55
 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978). 
56
 Id. at 777. 
57
 Id. 
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Thus, the prohibition against the government exercising that power to suppress 
certain information that it finds unfavorable is crucial.
58
 
The First Amendment specifically mentions that the freedom of the press 
should not be abridged.
59
 This allows the press to gather news from any source, as 
long as it is done in a lawful manner.
60
 The amendment was included in the Bill 
of Rights with the intent that it would protect free discussion about the 
government’s affairs and allow debate over public issues to be uninhibited.61 
Allowing the press to gather information on government officials in a way that 
can be made public is protected because it promotes that “free discussion of 
governmental affairs” and allows for information regarding public issues to be 
distributed more widely.
62
 
 A public interest in governmental affairs includes an interest in law 
enforcement action.
63
 Free discussion regarding law enforcement’s use of 
discretion, and whether it was used appropriately, is of great significance to the 
public interest since law enforcement officials could use that discretion to inhibit 
liberties of the citizens.
64
 Since issues regarding law enforcement’s use of 
discretion is important to the public interest, access to information about it 
                                                          
58
 Id. 
59
 U.S. const., Amend. I. 
60
 Houchins v. KOED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2588, 57 L. Ed. 2d 553 (1978). 
61
 Ariz. Free. Enter. Club’s Freedom Fund PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828-29, 180 L. Ed. 
2d 664 (2011). 
62
 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S. Ct. 1434, 16 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1966). 
63
 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035-36, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888 
(1991). 
64
 Id. 
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through the press was intended to be protected by the First Amendment as part of 
the “free discussion of governmental affairs.”65 
b. Evolution of the First Amendment Doctrines 
i. Extension from the Press to the Public 
While the First Amendment explicitly mentions a freedom of the press, it 
also includes language about freedom of speech generally and how other rights of 
the people, such as the right to petition the government for redress, are not to be 
inhibited.
66
 The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that the public has a 
right regarding access to information, including collection and distribution, which 
exists concurrently with the right of the press.
67
 The rights of the press are not 
special or exclusive for information that is not generally available to the public.
68
 
States have very “sharply circumscribed” limits that may be placed on First 
Amendment rights to collect and distribute information in public spaces.
69
 Since 
the public has a right that exists simultaneously with the right of the press, the 
public is also entitled to gather information that advances the free and open 
discussion of government affairs so long as it is done by lawful means.
70
 It would 
naturally follow that the public’s right to gather information about government 
affairs also includes a right to gather information about law enforcement’s use of 
discretion for the same reasons that the press is entitled to.
71
 
ii. Use of Recording Devices 
                                                          
65
 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Fund PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2828-29. 
66
 U.S. const., Amend. I. 
67
 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16, 98 S. Ct. 2588. 
68
 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 44 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972). 
69
 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 
2d 794 (1983). 
70
 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 1, 98 S. Ct. 2588. 
71
 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1035-36, 111 S. Ct. 2720. 
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The issue that appeared in Rivera is whether or not the right to use a 
recording device is a constitutional one that has been clearly established; not just 
whether the public has a right to gather information about law enforcement 
activity.
72
 Recording, whether by video, photograph, or audio, is considered a 
type of expression that is commonly used to preserve and distribute information 
and ideas.
73
 When regulations are placed on a mode of expression that ultimately 
will affect the quality of the communication itself down the line.
74
 Using 
recording to preserve and later distribute information and ideas is a type of 
expression that is “included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the 
First” Amendment that has been made binding on the states by means of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
75
  
iii. The Right to Criticize Law Enforcement Officials 
Included in the First Amendment protections granted to the people of the 
United States is the right to peacefully criticize law enforcement in the 
performance of their duties.
76
 This guarantee is a “principal characteristic by 
which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.”77 The Supreme Court has 
explained that peaceful criticism has a high value in a free society and provides a 
check on state power, and thus is deserving of protection.
78
  
This right, however, is not one without conditions. Criticism of law 
enforcement’s performance of their duties loses its protection when it forms “no 
                                                          
72
 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639 at *24. 
73
 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502, 77 S. Ct. 777, 96 L. Ed. 1098 (1952). 
74
 City of Lague v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 129 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1994).  
75
 Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502. 
76
 City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398. 
77
 Id. at 462-63. 
78
 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 109, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1972). 
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essential part of any exposition of ideas and [is] of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [the criticism] is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”79 In other words, 
criticism that is not founded in fact or does not advance public discussion but 
rather seeks only to undermine and mark the image of law enforcement might not 
be protected under the First Amendment.
80
 
Further, certain types of criticism directed at law enforcement may be 
unprotected under the First Amendment because it obstructs and investigation or 
jeopardizes officer safety.
81
 By virtue of their position in society and the 
government, “officers [are] entitled to enforce [the law] free from possible 
interference or interruption from bystanders.”82 Engaging in criticism that creates 
an obstruction to law enforcement or endangers the officers while performing 
their duties has a low social value when compared to the state’s valid interest in 
the maintenance of public order.
83
 Therefore, criticism of the police in a way that 
interferes with or creates danger to law enforcement will not be protected under 
the First Amendment. As a result of these Supreme Court decisions, whether a 
specific instance of exercising the right to criticize law enforcement will be 
protected turns on if that criticism was done in a peaceful manner as opposed to 
one that obstructed or endangered law enforcement officers. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT  
a. Right to Record Police Activity with Handheld Devices 
                                                          
79
 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1041 (1942). 
80
 Id. 
81
 Colten, 407 U.S. at 109, 92 S. Ct. 1953. 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. 
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Given the line of reasoning passed down by the United States Supreme 
Court regarding protected First Amendment rights, it would appear that the 
Second Circuit erred in holding that there is no clearly established right to record 
police activity with a handheld device such as a cell phone. While there has been 
a split amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeals, the reasoning required to make the 
right to record police activity a constitutional one has been previously decided by 
the United States Supreme Court. Since the basis has been so clearly passed down 
from the highest court, the Courts of Appeals should have also found that the right 
is clearly established and thus a claim under § 1983 would not be barred by 
qualified immunity. So far, the Eighth Circuit has yet to encounter a case where it 
will have to determine whether there is a clearly established constitutional right to 
record police activity with a handheld device. However, when the opportunity 
arises the Eighth Circuit should hold that this right has been clearly established as 
our understanding of the First Amendment has evolved. 
The United States Supreme Court has established conclusively that the 
freedom of the press mentioned in the First Amendment includes the right for the 
press to gather information by any lawful means.
84
 The purpose behind this is for 
the media to consolidate and distribute that information for the public to be aware 
of and to hold the government accountable.
85
 This right has been extended to 
private citizens in the United States as well.
86
  
Even if this right had not been clearly extended to private citizens, in this 
day and age the advances in technology “have made the lines between private 
                                                          
84
 See Part III(a), infra. 
85
 Id. 
86
 See Part III(b)(i), infra. 
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citizen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw.”87 People everywhere have 
cell phones that are capable of recording like a “traditional film crew” would have 
done in the past.
88
 In modern times, “news stories are now just as likely to be 
broken by a blogger at her computer as a reporter at a major newspaper.”89 It is 
clear that it is no longer feasible to protect the right to gather and distribute 
information under the First Amendment solely based on a profession or 
credentials.
90
 
Further, the Supreme Court has stated that people should be allowed to 
criticize law enforcement officers in the performance of their duties so long as the 
criticism does not interfere with the performance of those duties or endanger the 
lives of the officers in the process.
91
 This allows the state’s interest in the 
maintenance of order to prevail over an individual person’s criticism of the 
police.
92
 At the same time, this allows the United States to be a democratic society 
rather than a police state.
93
 By allowing the use of recording devices and allowing 
the public to criticize law enforcement, the Supreme Court has ensured that the 
free speech rights have been adequately protected, and by requiring that these 
actions take place in a lawful manner, peacefully, and in a way that does not 
interfere with an investigation or endangers officer safety, the jurisprudence has 
adequately balanced those rights with the government’s interest in an orderly 
society. 
                                                          
87
 Glik, 655 F.3d at 84. 
88
 Id. 
89
 Id. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Colten, 407 U.S. at 109, 92 S. Ct. 1953. 
92
 Id. 
93
 City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. at 462-63, 107 S. Ct. 2502. 
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Although the Third Circuit in Kelly found that there was not an established 
constitutional right to record police activity, the facts of that case were that the 
recording was taken during a traffic stop.
94
 This differs from most scenarios, such 
as the one presented in Glik where the recording was made from a distance while 
officers were arresting another individual.
95
 A traffic stop is a situation that differs 
in many significant ways from an arrest in a public place.
96
 The United States 
Supreme Court itself has consistently acknowledged “the inordinate risk 
confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile.”97 The 
court in Mimms referenced a study that stated that about thirty percent of police 
shootings took place as an officer was approaching a suspect who was sitting in 
an automobile.
98
 Another study had found “that a significant percentage of 
murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.”99 
Thus, the Third Circuit could have distinguished their finding from those of the 
other circuits by citing to the danger to officers inherent in traffic stops. This 
would still allow for a constitutional right to record police activity in other public 
places. 
 Any restriction placed on a constitutional right that encroaches on personal 
liberty is usually subject to strict scrutiny.
100
 In order to survive the strict scrutiny 
test, a limitation on the constitutional right to free speech must serve a compelling 
                                                          
94
 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. 
95
 Glik, 655 F.3d at 80. 
96
 Id. at 85. 
97
 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). 
98
 Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3 (1972). 
99
 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 
n.5 (1973). 
100
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965) (citing 
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S. Ct. 412, 4 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1960)). 
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government interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.
101
 
The Kelly decision would still be found to comport with this and thus be valid. 
There is no doubt that the government has a compelling interest in law 
enforcement officer safety.
102
 Since it has been well established that traffic stops 
are “especially fraught with danger to police officers,”103 prohibiting citizens from 
recording police activity during traffic stops is a restriction that would be 
narrowly tailored to serve the government interest in officer safety. The same 
would be true of a rule that prohibited the recording of police activity in a way 
that would be likely to endanger or impede law enforcement officers while they 
are engaged in their duties. Such restrictions would only be in effect when the 
method used to record police activity poses a threat to the safety of the law 
enforcement officials or their ability to carry out their legal duties. Thus, those 
restrictions would be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling “legitimate and 
weighty” interest that the government has in officer safety.104 These restrictions 
would likely have to come from individual States’ legislatures, however. 
The argument that allowing people to record in public places infringes 
upon the privacy of other citizens, especially those who were the subject of an 
arrest and did not give consent, was one that was used by police for years in a 
number of states when using wiretapping laws as a basis to arrest citizens who 
recorded police activity.
105
 However, a First Amendment right to record in public 
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areas outweighs these privacy concerns because when in public, “one person’s 
privacy collides with other peoples’ experience and memory.”106 Even 
photographic or video recording does not implicate privacy issues because “this 
amounts to nothing more than making a record, not differing essentially from a 
full written description, of a public sight which any one present would be free to 
see.”107  
Taking this as a whole, it seems only a matter of time before the 
recognition of a constitutional right to record police activity becomes well-
established across all of the circuits. Over the past year, as levels of distrust in the 
police have grown, it seems that citizens have been more prone to take out their 
cell phones and record when they see something that they believe to be excessive 
force or inappropriate police conduct. Allowing this as a constitutional right 
would likely serve an important function as a check on police officers as they 
carry out their official duties.  
Additionally, granting citizens the constitutional right to record police 
activity would probably also be beneficial to the states’ and police’s interests. 
Although many departments are now beginning to implement body camera 
programs, the body cameras do not capture everything about the officer’s 
surroundings and therefore may not tell the full story when an officer gets 
involved in an incident that draws public concern. If a citizen, standing at a safe 
distance away is allowed to record the incident without the fear of being arrested 
of having his or her cell phone seized, the surrounding circumstances are more 
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likely to be recorded and could be used to absolve the officer of any allegations of 
misconduct down the road. In an instance where a police officer did in fact 
commit some form of misconduct or there are potential criminal charges, having a 
video from a citizen that captures a more complete recording of the incident could 
be beneficial to the attorneys in the case as well. 
If citizens are concerned that they may be arrested or have their phones or 
cameras taken away from them by the police for recording police activity in 
public and from a safe distance away, this may cause hesitation to record or even 
prevent it fully. This would cause more harm to the system than good. As a result 
of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment rights to free 
speech and the restrictions laid out by prior case law, courts should recognize that 
the right to record police activity is a constitutionally protected right and not 
allow for qualified immunity when an officer arrests a citizen or seizes a phone 
from a citizen for exercising that right. 
b. Right to Record Police Activity with a Drone 
i. Use of Drones May Endanger Officer Safety or 
Obstruct Investigation 
 
The requirement that the recording and commenting on law enforcement 
activity not endanger law enforcement officers is well served by allowing 
recording by a handheld device, such as a cell phone, at a reasonable distance 
away. However, it is not clear that this requirement is met when a citizen uses a 
drone to record law enforcement actions from overhead, especially in a high 
stakes situation.  
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There is now “a wide and growing array of ever-more-sophisticated 
drones […] readily available for purchase at hobby stores and on the internet.”108 
Originally developed for use by the military, civilians and journalist have started 
to use them as well.
109
 Drones cost just a few hundred dollars and “can 
effortlessly be controlled from ordinary smartphones.”110 “As drone technologies 
improve, the list of promising domestic uses for the devices continues to grow.”111 
While Rivera may be one of the earlier cases where use of a drone to record 
police activity was an issue, the number of cases litigating this matter is likely to 
increase in the coming years. Thus, it would be prudent for the courts to adopt a 
position on whether use of a drone to record police activity is a right that is 
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment to the same extent as the 
right to record police activity with a handheld device. 
An officer on the ground when making an arrest or being engaged in a 
stop of some other kind is charged with the task of controlling their environment. 
While officers are trained to be aware of their surroundings, this task would 
become significantly more difficult if the officer had to be aware of not only what 
is going on around him or her, but also what is taking place in the air above. 
While the argument could be made that a drone that is only equipped with a 
camera to record what is transpiring below is not dangerous, law enforcement has 
no way of actually knowing what capabilities a drone has from that distance. A 
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general rule permitting citizens to use drones to record police activity from above 
would be overbroad in that it would be possible for people to use drones that had 
other capabilities as well. 
Drones “are often heavy, powerful machines.”112 Further, drones are 
generally electronic and operate on battery power. While hovering hundreds of 
feet over a situation that is transpiring may not be inherently dangerous towards 
law enforcement officers engaged in their official duties, there is always the 
possibility that while one of these may lose power or run out of a battery charge 
while flying over the officers. This could create a dangerous situation for the 
officers, as the officers would be at risk of being hit, and possibly severely 
injured, from a falling drone with gravity accelerating the speed of its fall over 
hundreds of feet. This risk would also interfere with the performance of duties by 
the officers because if a constitutional right to use drones to record police activity 
from above was established, officers would need to constantly be looking up in 
the air to make sure there is no drone falling at them. This would be distracting to 
the officer from the duties that he or she is engaged in, and could cause more 
mistakes or potentially allow a suspect to break free and escape or injure the 
officer.  
Even though the use of drones has only recently become more prevalent, 
there have already been some reports of drone operated by civilians “crashing into 
buildings [and] having hazardously close encounters with helicopters.”113  They 
have “crashed into skyscrapers in Midtown Manhattan and [fallen] to a sidewalk” 
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as well as “spun out of control and into the crown at a bull-running event in 
Virginia.”114 Even just a couple of months ago, a drone fell from the sky in 
California in pieces.
115
 One part of the drone hit an 11-month old baby girl as she 
was being pushed in a stroller by her mother, causing a large bruise on her 
forehead and a small cut on the side of her head.
116
 When the owner was 
interviewed by the police at the scene of the accident, he said that he had simply 
lost control of his drone.
117
 About a week prior to that incident, a New York City 
teacher was arrested after he crashed his drone into the empty seats at a U.S. Open 
tennis match.
118
  
These anecdotal stories illustrate the fact that it is highly possible for a 
drone operator to lose control of the drone he or she is piloting. This would 
definitely by an issue if the drone was hovering above police officers responding 
to a call. If a police officer was engaged in the process of making an arrest or 
rendering aid to an injured person, having a drone that may malfunction overhead 
could pose a serious threat to the officer’s ability to carry out those tasks. 
Additionally, an officer carrying out investigative tasks may be distracted from 
those duties if he or she had a drone hovering overhead, due to the fact that it 
could malfunction at any minute and come crashing down. Extending the 
constitutional right to record police activity to a right to use drones to record 
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police activity could put officers’ safety at risk and may impede ongoing 
investigations.  
Although denying the right to record police activity with a drone is 
limiting the First Amendment rights, it is one that is narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling government interest. As stated above, the government has a 
compelling interest in protecting the safety of its law enforcement officers. Given 
the dangers that the use of drones to record police activity could pose, limiting 
only the right to record by drone is sufficiently narrow that it would stand against 
strict scrutiny. 
 
 
ii. Use of Drones to Record May Not Be Lawful 
Even if the use of drones to record police activity did not pose a potential 
danger to the lives of police officers or have the potential to interfere with an 
investigation, it would still likely fail to be recognized as a clearly established 
constitutional right under a different analysis. The right to gather the news and 
record may be completed by use of any source so long as it is done by lawful 
means.
119
 Thus, if the recording is not done by a lawful means, it is not protected 
by the constitution so a police officer or other official interfering with such 
recording is not a violation of a constitutional right and there can be no § 1983 
claim for such interference. 
 As drones have become more and more prevalent, one of the key issues 
that has been repeatedly presented is how property laws will apply to the 
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increasing use of drones. This includes how to determine whether or not a drone 
is trespassing on private property based on its use. In many instances where there 
have been disagreements over a drone flying in a particular place, it has been 
unclear whether the operator of the drone was able to be held liable for such 
operation.
120
 For the time being, there is no clear set of laws that apply to drones 
so questions of liability remain largely unanswered.
121
 This means the legality of 
a drone appearing in certain locations is also largely unestablished.  
Originally, the common law rule was that whoever owned a certain patch 
of land owned the air above the land as part of their property interest in the 
land.
122
 Over time – and especially after airplanes, helicopters, and other related 
machines were developed – it became clear that it was not feasible to allow a 
landowner to have rights that reached all the way into outer space over the land 
that they owned.
123
 Recognizing the common law rule would mean that anytime 
an aircraft wanted to travel, it would be required to get an easement over the land 
that it sought to pass over from each individual landowner.
124
 Such a practice 
would have been impracticable, which is especially evident in modern times 
where so many aircrafts travel long distances each and every day. In relation to 
drones, this would mean that any drone operator who is sending his or her drone 
over someone else’s land would need that person’s permission to pass over the 
land prior to sending the drone on that flight. To combat this issue, the federal 
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government instituted laws that allowed flights to be made within the “navigable 
airspace,” which has been defined by regulations to mean airspace that is over 
five hundred feet above the ground.
125
 
The United States Supreme Court set out a landmark holding in United 
States v. Causby in 1946 which provided further, albeit unclear, guidance as to 
what rights the owner of a parcel of land has over the airspace above that land.
126
 
The Causby family sued the government over a number of flights passing over 
their land that were going from and coming to the airport that the government had 
leased on an adjacent parcel.
127
 The lights and loud noises from the flights were 
causing a panic among the chickens owned by the family, which led to the 
chickens flying into the walls of their coop and dying.
128
 The Causbys sued, 
alleging that the low flights constituted an impermissible taking of their land by 
the government and that they were entitled to just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment.
129
 
The Court started by declaring that the common law rule that allowed 
ownership rights to a landowner of all the airspace above his or her land defied 
common sense and could not be said to have any reasonable application in the 
modern world.
130
 In support of this finding, the Court pointed to the fact that 
Congress had already passed the previously mentioned legislation permitting the 
use of certain parts of the airspace by the public.
131
 The majority made clear that 
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the owner of a parcel of land owned the space above the ground that the owner 
could “occupy or use in connection with the land.”132 When the space above the 
ground that can be occupied or used by the owner for some purpose in connection 
with the land is invaded by another, that invasion has the same character as an 
invasion of the ground itself.
133
 Thus, when the airspace above one’s land is 
intruded upon by another the landowner may have a cognizable suit for trespass 
against the invader, who then may be civilly or criminally liable.
134
 
The holding in Causby, while recognizing that in some cases a landowner 
may have a valid trespassing claim against another, limits the extent to which the 
owner of a parcel of land owns the airspace above that land.
135
 The common law 
rule that the landowner alone owns the total airspace, extending into the 
atmosphere, above their land no longer has any application.
136
 As a result, 
airspace higher off the ground is not considered part and parcel of ownership of 
the land below and therefore, others cannot be excluded by the owner from those 
higher altitudes.
137
 Perhaps more importantly, and more relevant to the discussion 
of drones, the Causby holding provided basis for the rule that a landowner does in 
fact have the ability to exclude others from the airspace that is considered below 
the navigable airspace levels.
138
 
If a drone flies over a private landowner’s property within these lower 
altitudes or hovers above them, the operator could potentially be liable for 
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trespass. Thus, this would be an instance where the drone would be present in a 
place where it does not have a lawful right to be. Since Houchins held that the 
right to record is protected under the First Amendment so long as it is 
accomplished by lawful means
139
, if a drone that is recording is in a place without 
having a lawful right to be present then the drone would not be conducting its 
recording by lawful means. Such recording would not then be protected by the 
First Amendment. Whether a recording made by a drone is conducted lawfully, 
from a place where the drone has a legal right to be, turns on whether or not the 
airspace is in the public domain or is privately owned and subject to the right of 
exclusion. 
The Causby Court expressly declined to set a precise limit on how much 
space above the surface but below the five-hundred foot navigable airspace line 
could be considered the owner’s property.140 The only guidance provided by the 
court was that the landowner could exclude others from the “immediate reaches” 
of the land.
141
 The most specificity provided was that any part of the airspace that 
the landowner was able to “occupy or use in connection with the land” would be 
considered to be part of these “immediate reaches.”142 Also, as with most 
traditional property rights, the owner of the land would be able to exclude any 
type of invasion to the airspace above his or her land – but below the five-hundred 
foot navigable airspace line – that would interfere with the owner’s full 
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occupation or use of that airspace.
143
 Beyond this, there was no further guidance 
as to how one is to determine what the immediate reaches of the land are. There 
was no definitive test laid down as to how to determine what part of the land a 
landowner could necessarily use and occupy, nor how much of the airspace 
beyond the parts actively being used by the landowner would be considered to be 
within the “immediate reaches” of the land. Additionally, the standard developed 
in Causby is equally silent as to how one is to determine when a significant 
interference to the airspace use is present as the result of an intrusion. 
Which such ambiguous standards as to when an intrusion into the airspace 
over a specific plot of land is unlawful, it seems impossible to say that there can 
be a clearly established constitutional right to record police activity by drone. The 
argument could be made that a drone that is recording police activity in one area 
either passed through airspace owned by another or that it is hovering in a place 
that it does not have a lawful right to be. In other words, it would be possible to 
argue that any drone that is recording police activity is either currently trespassing 
or has trespassed on its path to get to the location it is currently in. If these 
arguments prevail, then the recording may have been obtained by unlawful means 
since the drone violated the trespassing rules to get to its location, and thus the 
recording would not be protected under the First Amendment. 
This type of recording would be easily distinguishable from one where a 
person is standing still in a public place to record by means of a handheld device. 
At that moment, the person would be in a public space – somewhere where there 
is a lawful right to be – and the recording would be taking place from that 
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location. Whether a drone is in a place where it has a lawful right to be is much 
more ambiguous, however, since that depends on whether the airspace is 
considered public or subject to the control of a landowner. This ambiguity and 
complexity as to whether a drone is in a certain place lawfully is illustrated by the 
fact that there have been so many concerns and issues that have yet to be resolved 
over whether the use of drones in various places can subject the drone operator to 
criminal or civil liability.
144
  
These issues have yet to reach the Courts of Appeals for determination in 
relation to drones, and given the uncertain standard laid out by the Causby 
doctrine the decisions that would follow from such cases would likely be far from 
consistent. This issue is also compounded by the fact that the FAA and other 
agencies, as well has Congress, have yet to pass laws and regulations specific to 
drone operations. While airplanes are allowed to fly in the public domain of 
“navigable airspace,” no similar promulgations have been made for the use of 
drones. 
Under property law, the use of a drone to record might not be considered 
lawful depending on the space that it is occupying when such recording is made. 
The way case law, laws on the books, and regulations currently stand, it is unclear 
when a drone operator will be subject to criminal or civil liability for piloting a 
drone in certain areas and when such operation will be considered lawful. As a 
result, if a police officer were to interfere with or inhibit a drone from recording 
police activity, the officer would likely be covered under qualified immunity from 
a civil rights violation claim under § 1983.  
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The right to record by drone is not a clearly established right under the 
First Amendment because in order to fall under the blanket of recordings that are 
protected, the recording must take place in a manner that is considered lawful. 
Since the issue of when and where the use of a drone is considered lawful is still 
largely undecided, it cannot be said that there is any clearly established rule as to 
the lawfulness of recording by drone. As a result, it logically follows that if the 
lawfulness of using a drone is not clearly established then the use of the drone to 
record cannot be considered a clearly established protected right under the First 
Amendment. Since the right is not one that is clearly established, qualified 
immunity may be applied to protect the officers from § 1983 liability.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment protects the rights of citizens and the press alike to 
engage in recording activity in public places as part of the freedom of expression. 
This includes police activity. However, this right is rightfully limited by 
constraining the right to record police activity in situations where it could be 
dangerous to the officers engaged in their official duties. Accordingly, there 
should not be a constitutional right to record police activity by way of drones, as 
drones have the potential to cause harm and injury to police officers even if the 
owner does not intend for them to. For the reasons outlined above, the 
constitutional right to record police activity should be limited to recording by 
handheld devices in situations that do not pose a risk to officer safety. Even if the 
argument was made that the right to record police activity by use of a drone 
should be considered a constitutional right, the ambiguity as to the lawfulness of 
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use of a drone prevents such a right from being considered a clearly established 
one.  
Thus, a claim against a police officer under § 1983 should not be barred 
by qualified immunity when the police officer interferes with or arrests a person 
recording the officers engaged in their official duties from a place where the 
person lawfully can be and by means of a handheld device when such recording 
does not endanger the officers or interfere with the performance of their duties. A 
claim against a police officer under § 1983 should, however, be barred against a 
police officer who interferes with or arrests a person who is recording by means 
of drone, at least under the current undeveloped laws and jurisprudence regarding 
drones.  
